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The Law of Economic Sanctions

Paul Szasz

O

VER THE YEARS, THE EXERCISE OF MILITARY FORCE to

accomplish national or international objectives has become ever less
acceptable and, in many instances, legally or politically objectionable.
Consequently, the alternative of relying on economic sanctions has become
more attractive. Indeed, the current decade has seen more instances of
internationally organized economic boycotts than has probably all of recorded
history, while at the same time individual national exercises of systematic
economic pressures have also increased.
As a result, there are by now sufficient instances in which economic
sanctions have been, and in some instances are still being, implemented that
some tentative conclusions concerning their effectiveness can be drawn and
the many legal problems that have, sometimes unexpectedly, arisen can be
examined. This study will concentrate on the latter, while questions
concerning effectiveness will be considered only in the context of whether a
low degree of effectiveness may be relevant to the legality of particular
measures and oflegal and administrative steps that might be taken to increase
effectiveness.
"Economic sanctions" will be dealt with in a broad sense-that is, all means
of exercising pressures short of the threat or use of military force directly
against a target State or entity. Thus, aside from strictly economic measures,

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

The Law of Economic Sanctions
pressures exercised through breaking or reducing diplomatic, cultural, or
communication ties will be considered.
The purpose of the pressures to be considered here must be to induce
compliance with some international obligation that the target State has failed
to observe. Collective sanctions for essentially punitive purposes have no
accepted place in international law, and the question of the legality of
individual national reprisal, retorsion, or retaliation will not be considered
here. Nor will this study address the question of the legality of applying
economic pressure as part of diplomatic bargaining. The pressures that will be
examined range from a mere refusal to trade or to maintain certain economic,
cultural, or diplomatic relations, to pressures on others to do likewise
(secondary boycotts), as well as the use offorce to prevent trading between the
target State and third parties.
The Right to Impose Economic Sanctions

Rights of Individual States. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
prohibits all UN members from resorting to the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State (i.e., UN member
or not). Though the point was not explicitly stated, the word "force" in this
context was at least initially generally understood to refer only to military
force. 1 It is, however, necessary to examine whether this restricted meaning
still prevails or whether some additional grounds have been developed for
proscribing the exercise of other types of pressures by UN members against the
political independence of any State.
Over the years, various international organs, and particularly the UN
General Assembly, have adopted a series of solemn resolutions that, inter alia,
are designed to delegitimize the use of economic force by individual States.
One of the first of these was the 1965 "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty," which declared that
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or other types or
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of
the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.2
Precisely the same text was repeated in the 1970 "Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,"3 which is
widely accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter. A similar
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text appears in the 1980 "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States."4
In 1995 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on "Economic Measures
as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing
Countries."s In it the Assembly expressed grave concern "that the use of
coercive economic measures adversely affects the economy and development
efforts of developing countries and has a general negative impact on
international economic cooperation" and urged
the international community to adopt urgent and effective measures to
eliminate the use by some developed countries of unilateral coercive measures
against developing countries which are not authorized by relevant organs of the
United Nations or are inconsistent with the principles contained in the
Charter of the United Nations, as a means of forcibly imposing the will of one
State on another.
In 1996 the General Assembly adopted a further resolution to similar effect,
under the title "Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures as a Means of
Political and Economic Compulsion.,,6 In 1997 it adopted by near unanimity a
resolution on "Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and
Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries"-in which it largely
repeated the 1995 language but added contravention of "the basic principles of
the multilateral trading system" as an additional ground for eliminating "the
use of unilateral coercive economic measures against developing
countries"-as well as an even stronger though more limited resolution on
"Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures.,,7
Consequent on the 1995 resolution, the UN Secretariat in the summer of
1997 convened an ad hoc expert group meeting on "economic measures as a
means of political and economic coercion against developing countries."s That
group concluded, under the heading of "basic legal norms," that
the basic principles ofinternationallaw ... as set out in the Charter of the United
Nations, elaborated in a number of international legal instruments and backed
by declarations adopted by international conferences, proscribe . . . the
imposition of coercive economic measures as instruments of intervention in
matters that are essentially Within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.9
The allowable exceptions the group recognized from this general prohibition
include: multilateral economic sanctions mandated by the Security Council (to
which most of the balance of this study is devoted); other situations where the
Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach
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of the peace, or act of aggression; where the Security Council has merely
recommended economic sanctions, provided that any limits specified by the
Council are observed; where the General Assembly recommends sanctions by
consensus or by large majorities over a period of time; certain instances where
regional organizations impose economic sanctions for cause against their own
members; where one or more States adopt unilateral measures in response to a
clear violation of universally accepted norms, standards, or obligations,
provided these States are not seeking advantages for themselves but are
pursuing an international community interest; and where the economic
measures constitute proportional countermeasures by a State for a prior injury,
provided inter alia that the measures are not designed to endanger the
territorial integrity or political independence of the target State. 10
In this connection it should be noted that the international community, as
represented by the UN General Assembly, has in the past several years and by
increasing majorities (in 1997, by 143 in favor and three against) adopted
ever,stronger resolutions of condemnation of the economic sanctions imposed
by the United States against Cuba. l1
It may thus be concluded that, as the twentieth century reaches its close, at
least de lege ferenda no State may any longer claim a general legal right to impose
economic sanctions against other States, except perhaps in situations where the
coercion is exercised in the interest of the international community and the
latter supports or at least does not strongly oppose the measures in question.

Role of International Organizations. Generally speaking, intergovernmental
organization (IGOs) cannot take any steps vis,a,vis third parties that would
not be within the authority of their members. However, if an organization
exercises coercive measures against one of its members and in accordance with
its constitution, then it may be said that that State has consented to such
exercise by becoming a member of the organization and a party to its
constituent treaty.
Even so, if the IGO in question is a "regional arrangement or agency" within
the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, then it may be bound by the
requirement in Charter Article 53 (1) that any enforcement action taken by a
regional IGO requires the authorization of the Security Council. It should,
however, be noted that in actual practice such IGOs {including the
Organization of American States (OAS) and various regional African
organizations, such as The Economic Council of West African States
(ECOWAS», have sometimes failed to secure such authorization, at least in
advance, and the Council has not actually condemned them for that.
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Aside from regional organizations, there are other IOOs whose charters
allow them to impose economic penalties on members under certain
circumstances. These IOOs include the International Atomic Energy Agency,
which is authorized to impose certain nuclear sanctions on States that violate
its safeguards-though for serious penalties it must tum to the Security
Council. 12 Other treaties, such as the Montreal Ozone Protocop3 and the
Chemical Weapons Convention,14 do establish IOOs, but the restrictions they
impose that prohibit members from trading with non,cooperating nonmembers
or with members in violation of certain treaty provisions, in materials covered
by the respective treaties, do not generally involve these IOOs in sanctions
decisions; rather these provisions are designed not so much to be coercive or
punitive but to allow the undisturbed functioning of the regimes established by
the treaties without giving an undue advantage to States not participating in
them. They will not be explored further here.
The Obligation to Participate in International Economic Sanctions
In contrast to the general prohibition against States imposing unilateral
economic sanctions against other States, when economic sanctions are
decreed by the UN Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, all members (except any that might be exempted pursuant to
Charter Article 48(1)) of the Organization are required to participate in such
collective measures. This obligation flows from Articles 2(5), 25, and 48(1) of
the UN Charter, by which all members are bound. As for nonmembers, Article
2(6) foresees that these too shall be required to cooperate, and in practice the
few nonmembers (notably Switzerland) have done so voluntarily. While other
IOOs cannot be commanded directly by the United Nations (though at least
the "specialized agencies" and certain others have undertaken through
relationship agreements to give serious consideration to UN
recommendations), their members are required by Charter Article 48(2) to
ensure their cooperation. Finally, private persons (natural or juridical), as well
as NO Os (which are established and operate under some nation's law), must be
required by their respective countries to conform to sanctions imposed by the
Security Council.
It should be noted that the Charter generally allows no exception or excuse
for noncooperation with sanctions-except that the Security Council can
(though it only most exceptionally does15) in effect exempt one or more
member States under Article 48(1). However, unless the Council does so, a
State cannot raise the argument that compliance with a particular measure
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ordered by the Council would violate a prior treaty or contractual
obligation-for under Charter Article 103 a member's obligations under the
Charter must prevail over those under any other international agreement. 16
Although Article 50 of the Charter recognizes that States may, as a result of
carrying out sanctions measures ordered by the Security Council, find
themselves confronted with special economic problems, such problems do not
permit these States to exempt themselves from compliance but only afford
them the right to consult with the Council regarding a solution to these
problems. 17
Finally, the question could be raised-though so far this has never formally
been done-of whether a UN member could refuse to participate in the
imposition of sanctions on the ground that these violated some higher norm,
such as binding provisions of humanitarian law (a question that has been
raised with respect to Iraq and will be examined below) or perhaps the
referred to in Charter Article 51 (a question
"inherent right of
that was raised with respect to Bosnia). It should be noted that there is no
provision for definitively settling a dispute between the Organization or one
of its organs and a member State. From the UN's point of view, it would
necessarily have to insist that determinations of the Security Council are
binding and that members have obligated themselves to comply with them.
The Councilor the General Assembly could request an advisory opinion of
the International Court ofJustice, either on that issue of principle or on the
legitimacy of a particular Security Council action, but the Court's opinion
would not be binding unless the State(s) concerned had agreed to accept it as
such.
The Imposition of Mandatory Economic Sanctions18
The authority of the UN Security Council to impose mandatory economic
sanctions constitutes part of a regime for the maintenance of international
peace and security, set out in some detail in the Charter, which in tum is based
on a considerably less detailed provision of the Covenant of the League of
Nations. Article 16(1) of that instrument provided that if any League member
resorted to war against another member, all other members were immediately
and automatically to subject the former to a severance of all trade and financial
relations, prohibit all intercourse with its nationals and prevent all financial,
commercial, or personal intercourse between them and the nationals of the
offending State. 19
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Formal Requirements. Under the UN Charter, the imposition of economic
sanctions is by no means automatic, but is part of a graduated scheme set out in
Chapter VII that remains at all times under the control of the Security Council.
The first step must be a determination by the Security Council under Article 39
of "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.,,2o Although in many instances (e.g., Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) the
validity of such a determination is not in doubt, in others (such as the
disintegration of the Somali government) the determination appears to have
been made solely for the, arguably laudable, purpose of allowing humanitarian
intervention in a country needing such assistance but not having any
government in a position to request it. 21 On the other hand, the determination
by the Council that the refusal of Libya to extradite two of its citizens to
Scotland or the United States for trial in the Lockerbie case constituted a
threat to or breach of the peace22 appears to have been merely a device to
enable three permanent members of the Council to reinforce their political
demands by the imposition of worldwide economic sanctions.23 Such
determinations have raised the cry, in both academic and in some diplomatic
circles, that the Council is exceeding its authority and that there appears to be
no mechanism for preventing actual or possible abuses thereof.
Having made a determination under Article 39, the Council may at the
same time, pursuant to that article and Article 40, "call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such prOvisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable." If it does so, the Council is to take account of any failure to comply
with such recommended measures.
Whether or not any provisional measures have been called for or
complied with, the Council may, under Article 41, decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call on UN members to apply such measures. Unless
otherwise clearly specified (e.g., that the Council is merely making a
recommendation or that it is not addressing itself to all members), such a
call is binding on all members. These measures "may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance
of diplomatic relations." As will be pointed out below, the Council can
adjust these measures from time to time. It can also impose certain measures
not explicitly listed in the Charter catalogue.
Should the Council consider that measures short of force are likely to be
inadequate or have proven to be so, the Council may under Article 42 move
to take military actions. These will not be examined in this study and are
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mentioned here only to illustrate that economic sanctions do not stand alone
but are part of a panoply of measures that the Council can deploy when faced
with threats to or breaches of the peace, or with acts of aggression. It should be
noted that the Council has considerable flexibility in doing so and is not bound
(except for making the initial determination under Article 39) as to the
sequence of the measures it may take. Nor is it required to restrict itself to one
or the other at a time; however, before moving to military measures, it must
make a determination that economic ones are not adequate to accomplish
their purpose.
In connection with the imposition of economic (or for that matter, military)
sanctions, the Charter does not require that the Council give a formal warning
to the target State. However, the General Assembly has recently
recommended to the Council that a warning in unequivocal language should
be given. 24
All decisions of the Council under Chapter VII-indeed all its substantive
decisions-require the affirmative vote of at least nine (of the fifteen) members
of the Council, "including the concurring votes of the [five] permanent
members." In spite of this apparently clear language, the Council has since its
very first year determined that only a negative vote by a permanent member
constitutes a veto-that an abstention does not. 25 Thus, in theory, a decision of
the Council could be taken by just nine of the non'permanent members, with
all the permanent members abstaining. In practice decisions under Chapter
VII are normally taken by near unanimity, especially of the permanent
members. The same is true of all decisions that change a sanctions regime,
whether to make it stiffer or easier, or to suspend or terminate it. The
consequences of this custom are explored below.
The p.ractice of the Security Council. The Security Council has imposed
mandatory economic sanctions infrequently. Each instance differs in at least
some interesting aspects from the others. They are, in the order of the date of
initial imposition, as follows:
• Southern. Rhodesia: 1965 arms and oil embargo and a break in economic
relations-terminated in 1979 on reaching the agreement, under the auspices
of the British government, that established Zimbabwe.26
• South Africa: 1977 arms embargo-terminated in 1994 on assumption of
power by the new government. 27
• Iraq, in connection with the invasion of Kuwait: 1990 comprehensive
economic embargo on exports and imports, especially on export of oil-still in
force subject to certain exemptions.28
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• Yugoslavia: (1) 1991 general and complete arms embargo on the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), continued after its dissolution in
respect of all the successor States-phased termination started in November
1995; (2) 1992 complete economic embargo (including flights, sporting and
cultural events) on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and later also
and especially on the Republika Srbska (the
Serb State in Bosnia and
Herzegovina)-first hardened and later eased, suspended from time to time
and then finally terminated in 1996.29
• Somalia: 1992 embargo on all arms deliveries.3o
• libya, in connection with the investigation of two airplane bombing
incidents: 1992 arms and air embargo, reduction of diplomatic missions, later
freezing of funds and embargo on importation of oil equipment.31
• liberia: 1992 arms embargo.32
• Haiti: 1993 oil and arms embargo, suspended and reinstated several
times, and terminated in 1994 on return of the Aristide government.33
• Angola: 1993 arms and petroleum embargo against UNITA
faction) and 1997 travel restrictions on high UNITA
officials;34
• Rwanda: 1994 arms embargo-partially suspended in 1995 and
terminated in respect of the government in 1996, but continued against
forces;35
• Sudan: 1996 diplomatic sanctions and later an air embargo;36 and
• Sierra Leone: 1997 arms and petroleum embargo and ban on travel by
senior personnel of the
government, terminated in 1998 on the
3
return of the elected President. ?
On the basis of these instances, a number of relevant practices of the
Security Council can be discerned. But first, a more general observation may
be in order. Except for two minor instances, almost all economic sanctions
were imposed in the first half of the 1990s. These were the years in which, as a
result of the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union and great political
weakness in China, the Cold War suddenly ended, leaving the international
diplomatic field at least temporarily to the Western allies and in particular to
the United States. At the same time the United Nations, freed of the former
political constraints and buoyed by the successful Namibia operation in
put into the field an entirely unprecedented number of
peacekeeping operations-some of which were also supported by sanctions
regimes. As it turned out, neither the infrastructure of the UN Secretariat nor
that of the Security Council was really up to this tremendous expansion of
business.38 Thus peacekeeping operations were launched and economic
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sanctions imposed without any significant studies of their objectives, means for
accomplishing them, collateral harms that might result, or exit strategies. By
the mid,1990s these faults were becoming evident. Even though the Council
itself seemed reluctant to change its ways (in part because it was constantly
busy with day,to,day decision,making), other UN organs, particularly the
General Assembly, have confronted the Council on some of these issues and
demanded reforms. These proposals too are reflected in the analysis below.

Decision'making by the Security Council. Decisions concerning sanctions-as
is true of most decisions during the past decade-are taken by the Security
Council in private consultation with all Council members, in most instances
probably preceded by unofficial meetings among some or all of the permanent
members. Only after a decision has been reached to accept the text of a
particular draft resolution (whether the decision takes hours or weeks of
negotiations) is a public meeting held at which the President (who rotates each
month) announces that agreement has been achieved on a text, which is then
distributed in public. A formal vote of the Council is then taken. After that
vote, some or all of the members may make explanatory statements. At the
same meeting, before or after the vote, nonmembers of the Council (in
particular the States especially concerned) are invited to make statements.
They evidently have no influence on the vote, because the decision on the
draft resolution has already been taken: very rarely is a resolution brought to a
public meeting and vote that is not assured of adoption, because of either
insufficient votes or a veto by one or more permanent members. Council
decisions of lesser import are increasingly taken in the form of presidential
statements. Also negotiated in private consultations, these are issued only
when a consensus39 formulation can be agreed onj however, decisions
imposing, changing, suspending, or terminating sanctions are invariably taken
in the form of formal resolutions.
This Council procedure has come under growing criticism by member States
without a seat on the Council, and complaints are often heard in the General
Assembly, especially in its Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on Strengthening the Work of the Organization. Though the
Council President of the month now regularly holds briefings after every
private consultations meeting, calls for increasing transparency and more
effective participation by nonmembers of the Council continue.40

Suspension and Termination of Sanctions. The precise conditions relating to
each sanctions regime are spelled out in the relevant Security Council
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resolutions, which may be amended from time to time to improve clarity, add or
remove conditions, or provide for ad hoc or long,term suspensions or ultimately
for termination. One point that has come under increasing criticism by target
States and the General Assembly itself is that although sanctions are imposed
in connection with some target State noncompliance with demands made by
the Council, the conditions for termination of the sanctions are by no means
always clear. In particular, in complex situations, in which sometimes dozens of
Security Council resolutions and an equal number of formal presidential
statements are made over a period of years (e.g., in respect ofIraq and the Gulf
War, or in respect of the Former Yugoslavia), with an equal or greater number
of reactions by the target States, the direct connection (if one ever existed)
between particular Council demands, State reactions, and sanctions measures
may be obscured or lost. In such cases the members of the Council, and in
particular the permanent ones, may disagree as to whether and when the target
State has met the conditions for the easing, suspending, or terminating of
sanctions.
In this connection it should be noted that sanctions resolutions have, with
very few exceptions, been adopted without any built,in time limits (i.e.,
"sunset" provisions). This contrasts sharply with the practice that has evolved
in respect of peacekeeping operations, whether of the "Chapter VI and a half'41
or the Chapter VII variety. These have, since the collapse of the First United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF always been approved for only relatively
short periods: normally six months, in a few instances shorter, rarely longer. At
the end of any such specified period the force is discontinued automatically
unless agreement can be reached on an extension; a resolution that so provides
is, of course, subject to veto by any permanent member.
\Vith respect to several of the long,term sanctions regimes, in particular
those still covering Iraq and Libya, and formerly the ones relating to
Yugoslavia, it appears clear that if a resolution to extend them without
significant change had to be put to the Council, it would fail-sometimes
because objective conditions have significantly changed, and sometimes
because of altered political perceptions and alignments of the Council's
permanent members. However, because sanctions regimes have no sunset
provisions, those who wish to terminate or modify them bear the burden of
convincing all permanent members not to veto such a change. It seems likely
that in the future the Council will not adopt significant sanctions regimes
without sunset provisions, because certain permanent members, and perhaps
some nonpermanent ones, will not consent to approving new open,ended
control regimes.

n,
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One factor that may contribute to such a change is the gradual recognition
of the reality that in spite of the Charter obligations of all UN members to
comply with Security Council,ordered sanctions, when a particular control
regime gradually loses its legitimacy (either because many States consider
that the target State has complied sufficiently with reasonable demands of
the Council, or because the burden caused by the sanctions on either the
target or on other States [discussed below] is considered excessive), the
necessary cooperation of States diminishes and gradually disappears. As a
particular sanctions regime thus visibly crumbles, even its most ardent
supporters may see the advantage of negotiating a formal termination rather
than tolerating, perforce, the informal disappearance of the regime, with the
bad example that may set for continuing respect for other, more important
ones.
In 1997 the General Assembly adopted a resolution,42 following extensive
consideration especially in the Informal Open,Ended Working Group on the
Agenda for Peace, reflecting a number of major and minor dissatisfactions \\ith
the practices of the Security Council regarding the imposition of economic
sanctions. In that resolution, which is not binding on the Council,43 the
Assembly inter alia recommended that "[t]he Council should define the
time,frame for sanctions regimes taking [specified] considerations into account"
and that the "steps required from the target country for the sanctions to be lifted
should be precisely defined" by the Council.44
At present, with respect to the open,ended regimes, the burden is effectively
on those wishing to terminate them to offer proposals acceptable to the
permanent members that wish to maintain them. Sometimes decisions have
been taken to suspend these regimes, either for short, renewable terms (which
permits the proponents of a particular regime to veto each further extension of
the suspension)45 or indefinitely, in contemplation of an eventual termination
but still allowing automatic reinstatement if a negative report is received from a
designated official.46

Formal Targets of Sanctions. Normally, States are the targets of economic
sanctions imposed by the Security Council. There are exceptions. For example,
in imposing sanctions in respect of Angola, the Council targeted not the
country as a whole but only the UNITA rebels that continued to fight the
government in spite of several negotiated and agreed cease,firesY Starting in
September 1994, the Security Council imposed special sanctions in respect of
the Republika Srpska,48 the unrecognized Serb State established within Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
466

PaulSzasz
In other instances, the Security Council, having concluded that
undifferentiated sanctions may only injure the powerless masses (see below),
has targeted especially governmental elites whose behavior caused the
international offense for which sanctions were imposed and who may be in a
position to bring the country into compliance. For example, in employing
economic sanctions to neutralize a military coup against the elected
government of Sierra Leone, the Council, inter alia, ordered all States to
prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of "members of the
military junta and adult members of their families."49
Enforcement of Sanctions. Although all UN members are required to comply
with economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, the enthusiasm of
these States for carrying out their assigned tasks in any given case is likely to be
uneven. Some are economically deeply involved with the target State and apt
to suffer painful economic losses (see below). Others may, on principle or for
particular political reasons, not be in agreement with the Council as to the
imposition or the continuation of sanctions. Also, some States may not really
be in full control of their nationals, who might take advantage of an official
breach of trade relations in order to smuggle goods at a profitable markup.
These States may also lack the domestic legal mechanism for banning their
nationals from forbidden trading and must install it (perhaps through
parliamentary action) before it can be effective.
For all these reasons, fully voluntary compliance is apt to be an uneven
affair, with immediate compliance low but strengthening over time, until
perhaps international enthusiasm for the sanctions regime flags and
compliance slips again.50 In imposing sanctions, the Security Council therefore
normally requests States to report on the legal and practical measures that they
have taken to comply, and to require their nationals to do so. In most instances
the Council also establishes a Sanctions Committee (see below), whose
primary charge is to monitor compliance with sanctions, partly on the basis of
the reports received from States. These are naturally likely to be somewhat
self,serving and States in serious noncompliance are apt to fail to submit
reports at all. The Committee is normally also authorized to receive reports,
usually from other States, about instances of noncompliance.
In some instances the Security Council has established formal control
mechanisms, in particular by authorizing interested States to monitor sea lanes
leading to the target country.51 When that country also has land borders, and
especially if transit trade passes through it which the Council is not eager to
disrupt, monitoring becomes more difficult. This was especially true in respect
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of the sanctions imposed on the FRY, and even more particularly of those on
the Republika Srpska, which shares a long border with the FRY. Though
various attempts were made, the sanctions on Yugoslavia, while not entirely
ineffective and in many ways painful, were notoriously leaky.52 In its recent
resolution on sanctions, the General Assembly emphasized the importance of
compliance by member States and made various recommendations concerning
their role as well as that of the Council in improving monitoring of and
compliance with sanctions.53
At times, the Security Council has authorized a form of blockade designed
to prevent forbidden cargo from entering or leaving the targeted State.54
Typically, such measures are easier to maintain along a sea coast than along a
land border. It should be noted that such a use of military force is generally not
considered to be an exercise pursuant to Charter Article 42, but rather a means
of implementing economic sanctions ordered under Article 41 and carried out
under the aegis of that provision.

Sanctions Committees. In connection with almost every sanctions regime, the
Security Council has established a Sanctions Committee as a subsidiary organ
of the Council. The structures of all these bodies are essentially identical: all
fifteen members of the Council are represented, which means that each year
five of the nonpermanent members are replaced. The actual participants are
lower,ranking members of the respective delegations. In the case of the United
States and some of the other permanent Council members these
representatives are specialists in sanctions questions and are supported by an
appropriate infrastructure {i.e., contacts in the Departments of State, Defense,
Treasury, Commerce, and probably the intelligence community}, while the
nonpermanent members are mostly represented by junior,level diplomats
working part,time on these issues. As a number of such Committees function
at the same time, the total burden of participation can be heavy. The chairmen
of these Committees are chosen from among the nonpermanent members and
serve for at least a year {unlike the monthly rotation of Council Presidents}.
The Secretariat generally services these Committees in only a formal way {i.e.,
arranging for meetings and for the flow of documentation}, without substantive
support in terms of economic or other analysis. As the composition of each
Committee is identical to that of the Council, formal reports are rare (each
representative presumably keeps his delegation sufficiently informed). This
arrangement deprives the rest of the UN membership of insight into the work
and decisions of these important bodies. Accordingly, and although annual
reports from each Committee to the Security Council are now required,s5 a
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General Assembly resolution has called for greater transparency in their
work.56
The Committees work by consensus, with certain decisions normally taken
on a no,objection basis. In particular, those decisions authorizing
humanitarian shipments are circulated to all Committee members. If none
objects within a given time frame, they are deemed approved; however, any
representative may put an indefinite hold on any approval, without stating a
reason. Under the consensus rule such a hold cannot be broken without the
consent of the objecting representative.
Each Sanctions Committee receives special assignments in the Council
resolution establishing it; subsequent resolutions often expand these
assignments. In general, the tasks are the following:
• To monitor the implementation of sanctions, by reviewing the
compliance reports submitted by States and considering information received
from other States about violations, and by reporting violations to the Councip7
• To consider applications for exceptions and exemptions provided for by
the Council, mostly for humanitarian purposes (see below)58
• To consult, on behalf of the Council, with States alleging special economic
problems arising out of their compliance with sanctions (see below).59
In recent years the Council has also required the Committees to promulgate
guidelines to inform those concerned about the application procedures and the
circumstances in which these and other types of relief are apt to be granted. A
General Assembly resolution has called on the Council to make the mandates of
the Committees more precise, to take account of what can be fulfilled in practical
terms, and to specify standard approaches to be followed by the Committees.6o
These Assembly recommendations reflect the fact that over the years
dissatisfaction with the performance of the Sanctions Committees has grown.
In part, this has been due to their insufficiently precise mandates, to the sheer
volume of work in dealing with numerous applications, and to a general
unresponsiveness to apparently legitimate concerns of target States and of
nontarget States injured by the sanctions regime. The Council itself has
responded to some of these criticisms by issuing guidelines in the form of a
series of presidential notes in 1995-1996,61 but the Assembly believes these
have not solved all problems.62
Impact of Economic Sanctions on the Designated Targets

Objectives and Types of Sanctions. The general objective of sanctions is to
induce compliance by the target State (or other entity) with the Security
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Council demands for particular actions to be taken or discontinued in order to
eliminate threats to or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.
Some sanctions, in particular arms embargoes, are meant to disable or at
least to restrict a government or some other target entity from continuing
effectively the proscribed conduct. The prospects of success depend on the
extent to which the target authorities are dependent on major and relatively
sophisticated weapons systems, whose flow can most easily be controlled.
Embargoes on the import of petroleum and other oil products may also have
the effect of hindering a war machine heavily dependent on such imports.
For the most part, however, sanctions are designed to exert general pressures
on the economy of the target country in the hope that rational considerations
will cause the government or the ruling elite to yield on the issues of concern to
the Council so as to relieve the pressures on the economy. Unfortunately, this
calculation rarely works, for the target States are almost always authoritarian
(sometimes it is the very authoritarian and illegitimate nature of the government
that provokes the imposition of sanction), in which the general population may
suffer, sometimes severely, without being able to induce its government to
change its course. As discussed below, if the pressures on the general population
become, or at least are deemed to have become excessive, this may raise legal or
at least public relations concerns making it difficult for the world community to
continue that type of pressure. In some instances, resistance to
economic sanctions comes less from the target State and more from the
traditional trading partners who wish to resume normal commerce, though they
may be subtly encouraged to raise their voice by the target State itself.
In some cases the argument for general economic sanctions may not be
expressed in such essentially political terms, but rather as an attempt to weaken
the country so as to make it less able to carry out the mischief that is of concern
to the Council.
Because, as will be demonstrated below, general economic sanctions have
only rarely proven to be effective, and because they may inflict possibly undue
pain on an essentially impotent population and significantly burden
neighboring States, other types of sanctions have been tried and are coming
increasingly into favor. For example, in many of its recent resolutions (e.g.,
those relating to Iraq, Angola, and Sierra Leone), the prohibition is on travel by
governmental figures, particularly those held especially responsible for the acts
that provoked the Security Council, as well as by their families, or generally by
the elite of the country. Though perhaps these restraints may also not prove
effective, they at least target for discomfort those who bear some responsibility
for the situation, rather than the arguably innocent and impotent masses.
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Another type of sanction that has been used from time to time and that has
in a few instances proven to be surprisingly effective without significant side
effects have been cultural sanctions, in particular the exclusion of athletes of
the target country from international sports competitions.63 In respect of South
Africa and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, these exclusions, evidently
for psychological reasons, struck peculiarly sensitive nerves, and the rulers of
these countries were prepared to make significant concessions to terminate
them.

The Actual Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions. Reviewing the history of the
application of economic sanctions and the consequences thereof, the picture,
based on a few prominent examples, is rather mixed.
• The government of Southern Rhodesia, which was exposed for well over a
decade to economic sanctions, in particular as to the import of petroleum
products, eventually yielded and in negotiations under the auspices of the
British government agreed to the arrangements that established the State of
Zimbabwe. Although the long' continued sanctions were probably a factor
(they were to an extent always neutralized by South Africa, itself a pariah
State), probably more important was the continuing and increasingly savage
civil war supported by neighboring States.
• South Africa was technically subject only to an arms embargo, which
caused it to build up, albeit at considerable expense, an autonomous arms
industry. However, though general obligatory economic sanctions were
blocked in the Security Council by Western vetoes, the General Assembly
recommended such sanctions to all States. Though not binding on UN
members, more and more complied. Once the United States did so too
(because of domestic political concerns), the pressures of the South African
business community on the government became significant and almost surely
contributed to the unexpectedly peaceful denouement.
• Iraq was clearly not deterred by the severe economic sanctions imposed
immediately after its invasion of Kuwait. Although there were some significant
arguments before the Coalition air attacks were unleashed some five months
later, that more time should be allowed for the economic sanctions to work
(arguments that were countered by pointing to the increasing suffering of the
Kuwaiti people under the continuing occupation), the very fact that the
destruction wrought by six weeks of practically unrestrained bombing was also
insufficient to cause Iraq to leave Kuwait suggests that no severity or extent of
economic sanctions could have achieved that result. The continuation of the
practically unrelieved sanctions into the postwar period {including a severe ban

471

The Law of Economic Sanctions
on all but humanitarian imports and also on the export of Iraq's one
commodity, oil-though these have lately been considerably eased) is designed
to encourage Iraqi cooperation with a number of Council objectives, such as
the monitoring of arms facilities, the return of Kuwaiti prisoners and captured
property, and eventually the financing of the UN Claims Commission.
However, it is not clear that the sanctions have induced Iraq to become in any
way more cooperative. Rather than complying willingly, it is instead mounting
a massive propaganda campaign against the continuation of the sanctions
regime.64
• The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was subjected to increasingly severe
economic, cultural, and diplomatic sanctions starting in 1992, for the most part
because ofits intervention in the Bosnian civil war on the side of the Bosnian Serbs
(Republika Srpska). These sanctions, though never implemented fully because of
Yugoslavia's many land borders65 with States that were either somewhat
sympathetic to the Serb cause or were for political or economic reasons not in a
position to oppose Yugoslav interests too directly, were effective enough to cripple
the FRY economy and give rise to an enormous black market conducted by
associates of the ruling officials. To secure an easing of these sanctions, President
Milosevic of Serbia agreed in September 1994 to cut off assistance to the Bosnian
Serbs. As a result, a few economic and cultural sanctions on the FRY (but not the
Republika Srpska) were suspended for a series of hundred,day periods.66 At the
conclusion of each the Council examined FRY's behavior before granting a further
extension.67 After the Dayton Accords all the remaining sanctions were first
suspended indefinitely,68 and then terminated on the basis of compliance reports
from those implementing the agreements.69 It can thus be said that these sanctions
had at least been moderately effective.7o
• The Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia and after its dissolution all of its
successor States were subjected to a complete arms embargo from 1991 71 until
1996.72 That embargo, though never particularly effective (especially against
the Serbs, who inherited most of the enormous arms stocks of the SFRY)
because of the many land borders the successor States had with sympathetic
States, succeeded in somewhat reducing the flow of heavy and modern
armaments into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they would have threatened
UN and other international forces. In particular, the Bosnian Muslims
complained that the embargo unfairly prevented them from exercising their
inherent right of self,defence, a complaint that found a sympathetic ear in the
United States, which at least passively abetted a flow of arms to themP
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Altogether, there is no unambiguous answer to the question of the
effectiveness of economic sanctions, except to say that if they work at all they
application.
appear to require
Critics have pointed out that one reason for both the frequent
ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and for our uncertainty about their
operations is that the United Nations has not been in a position, in considering
the imposition of sanctions, to make any detailed projections as to their likely
effect, and during their actual application to secure any but anecdotal evidence
about their actual effectiveness and their impact on the target State. Thus,
whether or not economic sanctions could actually be effective if applied
scientifically, this has never actually been done. At most, the Organization has
relied on studies prepared by the governmental services of some of the
permanent members, studies which were not shared with the United Nations
itself but which presumably motivated the decisions proposed by their
representatives in the Security Council and Sanctions Committees.
It might be pointed out that part of the difficulty in dealing objectively and
scientifically with this subject is a terminological one. The "effectiveness" of
sanctions can refer to any of three distinct calculations: (1) the extent to which
States actually comply with the Security Council directives to cut off the flow
of commerce or finances to and from the target State; (2) the extent to which
such a cut in the international flow of resources actually impacts on the
economy of the target State; (3) the extent to which the target State actually
modifies its behavior as a result of the impacts on its economy.

Legal Constraints on Economic Sanctions. The
economic
sanctions on the FRY and especially those on Iraq have raised the specter of
undue harm to the most vulnerable members of the target society: children and
the women who care for them, the elderly, and the sick. It is true that these
sanctions regimes, as adopted by the Security Council, invariably exempted the
supply of food and medicines for humanitarian purposes and that the
respective Sanctions Committees were given broad powers to grant effective
relief. Against this, the target States and their sympathizers claim that the
Sanctions Committees, as they actually operate, are far too prone to allow
indefinite and unexplained holds on proposed humanitarian shipments. In
addition, it is claimed that because the foreign assets of target States are frozen
and their exports blocked, these States are not in a position to purchase even
the humanitarian supplies that they would be permitted to import.
Naturally, the proponents of sanctions deny the allegations of undue
harshness in the implementation of sanctions regimes; they countercharge that
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the target States generally appear to have sufficient hidden assets to finance
the import of luxury goods for their elites and even extensive armament
programs, that their governments often distribute available humanitarian
supplies unfairly, and that extensive black markets are allowed to flourish for
the benefit of those close to the government.
From a legal point of view it is undoubtedly true that even the United
Nations and the Security Council, and of course all States, are bound by
universally applicable humanitarian principles that forbid the starvation of
civilian populations74 and that call for special care to be taken to protect
vulnerable persons.75 To give precision to these concepts, the General
Assembly has called for further attention to the concept of the "humanitarian
limits of sanctions" and proposed that "standard approaches should be
elaborated by the relevant United Nations bodies." At the same time, the
Assembly has made a number of pertinent operational recommendations. 76
Impact of Economic Sanctions on Third States77
It was recognized already in the Covenant of the League of Nations that a
might
universal obligation to impose economic sanctions on
require mutual support in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience
resulting from such economic measures. 78 The UN Charter preserved this rule
in Article 49. It also added Article 50, which, although going somewhat
further, ultimately contents itself with granting States "confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of [preventive or
the Security Council with
enforcement] measures" only "the right to
regard to the solution of these problems."
When this Article was being formulated at the San Francisco Conference,
several initiatives for strengthening it were turned down. These included a
South African proposal that a State suffering economic damage from sanctions
not directed against it should be able to charge the target State, through the
Security Council, to pay compensationj79 another was a Venezuelan proposal
that if approached by a State that had suffered damage, the Council would be
obliged to take corrective measures. 80 From the text adopted, it appears clear
that the State concerned has no "right" except to consult the Council.
Incidentally, what pertains to economic difficulties arising directly from a
State's application of sanctions, applies even more strongly to those that merely
suffer from the general economic distortions resulting from the sanctions
regime.
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The question then arises what steps the Security Council could take to
relieve a complainant State. Though not specified in Article 50, it appears from
Article 48(1) that the Council could excuse a State from participating in the
imposition of the sanctions. In the World Court's advisory opinion in the
Certain E:I.-Penses case it is suggested that the Council- could provide for the
United Nations to pay compensation to such a State, the costs of which would
then be assessed on all members as expenses of the Organization.81
In practice, from the very first time that the Security Council imposed broad
economic sanctions; i.e., those on Southern Rhodesia, neighboring States that
were especially affected have sought to resort to Article 50. Indeed, this has
been the case in respect of all such broad sanctions-but of course not in those
instances when the embargo was merely on the sale of arms or on
communications, or on cultural or diplomatic intercourse. The Council, in
tum, has generally referred these States to the respective Sanctions
Committee, charging these with giving the complainant States a hearing but
not authorizing the Committees to grant any specific relief.
In no instance has a Sanctions Committee recommended the exemption
48 (1) of a complainant State from the obligation to participate in
under
the sanctions regime.B2 Further, in no instance has consideration been given to
compensating directly such a State from the UN budget. Instead, the
Committees, or the Council on their recommendation, have issued general
appeals to the international community, that is to other States and competent
IOOs or organs, to assist particular States or the affected States in general.
Though
has been some response to th\'!se appeals and assistance has been
provided to the most severely affected States, in general the relief provided has
been in no degree commensurate with the damage caused or at least claimed.83
The result has been tnat the burden of sanctions has remained distributed most
unevenly among member States, generally with the target's neighbors or its
traditional trading partners affected much more severely than others,
especially the permanent members of the Security Council.84
For some years affected States have been taking their complaints to the
Oeneral Assembly, which has launched several studies and considerations on
this subject.8s Some of the Assembly's latest recommendations are set out in its
above,mentioned resolution on sanctions, which in this respect merely
recommends that the Assembly itself and other relevant organs "should
intensify their efforts to address the special economic problems of third
countries affected by sanctions regimes" and that the subject be studied more
intensely in the near future. 86 Other recommendations, also calling mostly for
further studies, appear in the 1997 resolution on "Implementation of the
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Provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Relating to Assistance to
Third States Affected by the Application of Sanctions."s7 The
Secretary,General had already suggested in the 1992 An Agenda for Peace that
the Security Council devise a set of measures involving financial institutions
and the UN system "to insulate States from such difficulties."as
Conclusions
Unlike "sanctions" imposed by individual States or groups of States, the
legality of which have become ever more suspect over the past decades and
particularly in recent years, the legal foundations of economic sanctions
imposed by the Security Council under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
Charter are solidly founded in international law. However, this does not mean
they are not problematic.
One difficulty, of what initially may appear to be primarily a practical nature,
is that in the past almost no collective efforts (as distinguished from those of
individual members, in particular the permanent members of the Security
Council) have been made to establish on the basis of thorough economic and
political studies what sanctions can sensibly be applied to a target State, what
their likely impact would be on the target and on other States, how well
sanctions are actually implemented, and what their actual effects are over time.
Thus, this potentially devastating economic weapon is being used without
proper guidance or control. In particular, it is difficult to tell, because of the
dearth of significant information on most sanctions regimes, whether their
impact is proportionate to the benefit sought. Evidently, the possible infliction
of major harm that mayor may not conform to the general rule of
proportionality is problematic from a legal point of view.
Secondly, it is necessary to address the essentially legal issue of the
"humanitarian limits of sanctions," i.e., whether some economic sanctions may
not be applied or continued indefinitely if their impact on vulnerable
populations is excessive. While it seems clear that in principle there must be
some limits, the difficulty is in deciding whether in a given case the ostensible
effects of the sanctions imposed are indeed excessive, and if so whether the
cause for that excess lies in the rules establishing the regime in question, in the
implementation of that regime by the competent Sanctions Committee, or
perhaps in the authorities of the target State, which may deliberately distribute
the resources available to it in such a way as to put even legitimate sanctions in
an unfavorable light.
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Finally, the problem recognized in Article 50 of the UN Charter, that is the
collateral damage that a sanctions regime may impose on innocent third
parties, has so far not been satisfactorily or systematically addressed. The
hardship caused by these regimes is thus most arbitrarily and unevenly
distributed, sometimes burdening the weakest and often uninvolved States
rather than those more responsible for their imposition and better able to bear
the burden.
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